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MALONEY

[8. F. No. 22596.

v.

RATH

In Bank.

[69 C.2d

Oct. 7,1968.]

KATHLEEN MALONEY, Plaintiff and Appellant, v.
RAMONA M. RATH, Defendant and Respondent.
[la-Ie] Automobiles-Operation-Care--Defects in Brakes: Presumptions.-A defendant's failure to comply with Veh. Code,
§§ 26300, 26453, 26454, relating to the maintenance of a vehicle's braking equipment, gives rise to a presumption of his
negligence, and, although he may rebut the presumption by
proof that he did what might reasonably be expected of a
person of ordinary prudence, acting under similar circumstances, who desired to comply with the law, the statutes
recognize that improper maintenance threatens a grave risk of
serious bodily harm and death, thus rendering the statutory
duty nondelegable.
[2a, 2b] Id.-Operation-Defects in Brakes: Defenses: Sufficiency
of Evidence--Defective Equipment.-In an action for damages
for injuries incurred in an automobile accident caused by the
failure of defendant's brakes, it was no defense that she
rebutted the presumption of her own negligence by showing
that the brakes had been overhauled three months before the
accident, that the car had been inspected for damage after an
intervening accident, that the brakes gave no warning of their
impending failure and that the defects would be apparent only
to a mechanic, where it was undisputed that the brake failure
resulted from the negligence of the gas station with which she
had contracted to perform the overhaul and inspection.
[3] Id.-Operation-Care--Persons Liable--Strict Liability-Violation of Safety Provision of Code.-A violation of a safety
provision of the Vehicle Code does not make the violator
strictly liable for damage caused by the violation.
[4] Negligence--Nondelegable Duties.-Unlik'e strict liability, a
nondelegable duty operates, not as a substitute for liability
based on negligence, but to assure that when the negligently
caused harm occurs, the injured party will be compensated by
[1] Automobiles: effect of defecti"e brakes on liability for
injury, note, 14 A.L.R. 1339, 63 A.L.R. 398, 170 A.L.R. 611. See
also Cal.Jur.2d, Rev., Automobiles, §§ 190, 191 j Am.Jur.2d, AutoIliohiles and Highway Trnfiic, ~ 351.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Automobiles and Other Road Vehicles, §§ 108(2), 193(3) j [2] Automobiles and Other Road Vehicles, §§ 108(2), 177, 220; [3] Automobiles and Other Road
Vehicles, §159(1)j [4] Ncgligence, §2.5; [5] Automobiles and
Other Road Vehicles, §§ 79(1) (a), 174; [6] Automobiles and
Other Road Vehicles, §§ 155(1),174.
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the person whose activity caused the harm and who lJlay
therefore properly be held liable for the negligence of his
agent, whether his agent was an employee or an independent
contractor.
[6] Automobiles-Opera.tion-Care-Motor Vehicle as Da.ngerous
Instrumentality: Persons Liable-Acts of Independent Contractors.-A violator of the statutory provisions of the Vehicle Code regulating the maintenance and equipment of
automobiles is subject to the rule that one who carries on an
activity which threatens a grave risk of serious bodily harm or
death unless the instrumentalities used are carefully nlaintained, and who employs an independent contractor to maintain such instrumentalities, is subject to the same liabilities
for physical harm caused by the negligence of the contractor
in maintaining such instrumentalities as though the employer
had himself done the work of maintenance.
[6] Id.-Operation-Care-Violaton of Regulations-Maintenance
of Equipment: Persons Liable-Acts of Independent Contractors.-A violator of the statutory provisions of the Vehicle Code regulating the maintenance and equipment of automobiles is subject to the rule that one who by statute or by
administrative regulation is under a duty to provide specified
safeguards or precautions for the safety of others is subject to
liability to the others for whose protection the duty is
imposed for harm caused by the failure of a contractor employed by him to provide such safeguards or precautions.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the
City and County of San Francisco and from an order denying
a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Charles
S. Peery, Judge. Reversed.
Action for personal injury and property damages arising
out of an automobile collision. Judgment for defendant reversed.
Morgan & Moscone, Charles O. Morgan, Jr., and George R.
Moscone for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Gassett, Perry & Katzen and Noel B. Gassett for Defendant
and Respondent.
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Plaintiff brought this action to recover
damages for injuries to her person and property incurred in
an automobile accident. She appeals from an adverse judgment and from an order denying her motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict on the issue of liability.
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Plaintiff stopped her ear in a left-turn lane to wait for a
traffic signal to ehange. Defendant turned into tlle left-turn
lane behind plaintiff and stepped on her brake pedal. Defendant'8 brakes failed, and a collision ensued.
Defendant neither knew nor had reason to know that her
brakes were defective until they failed. The failure was
caused by a rupture in a hydraulic hose that gave no warning
to defendant of its impending occurrence. Defendant had the
brakes completely overhauled by Peter Evanchik of Pete's
Chevron Station about three months before the accident.
JJater, about two weeks before the accident, the car was
involved in another collision, and defendant's husband had
Evanchik inspect and repair it. Nothing was done to the
brakes at that time. Defendant's expert witness testified that
the brakes failed because of a hole in the hydraulic hose tha.t
was caused by rubbing of the hose against the right front
wheel. The rubbing resulted from faulty installation of the
hose at the time the brakes were overhauled. A qualified person inspecting the brakes before they failed would llave
detected the faulty installation and the evidence of the
rubbing.
At the time of the accident section 26300 of the Vehicle
Code provided that every motor vehicle "shall be equipped
with brakes adequate to control the movement of the vehicle
and to stop and hold the vehicle," and section 26453 providcd that all "Brakes and eomponent parts thereof shall be
maint.ained . . . in good working order." (See also Veh.
Code, § 26454.) [la] A defendant's failure to comply with
these provisions gives rise to a presumption of negligence tllat
he may rebut by proof "that he did what might reasonably be
expected of a person of ordinary prudence, acting under similar circumstances, who desired to comply with the law."
(Alarid v. Vanier (1958) 50 Cal.2d 617, 624 [327 P.2d 897],
see also cases cited on p. 622; Evid. Code, § 669, added by
Stats. 1967, ch. 650, § 1.)
[2a] Defendant offered suffieient evidence to rebut the
presumption that she was negligent. 'fhe brakes had been
overhauled three months before the accident; the car was
inspected for damage and repaired after another accident in
the interim; and the brakes gave no warning to defendant of
their impending failure. Moreover, she was not negligent in
failing to discover the faulty installation of or the growing
damage to the hose, for those defects would be apparent only
to a mechanic.
Plaintiff contends, however, that proof that defendant was
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not herself negligent should not absolve her from liability for
the damage caused by the failure of her brakes. She contends
that the court should reconsider the Alaricl decision and hold
that a motorist is strictly liable for damage caused by a brake
failure or hold that the duty to exercise reasonable care to
maintain adequate brakes is nondelegable.
[3] We adhere to the holding of the Alarid case that a
violation of a safety provision of the Vehicle Code does not.
make the violator strictly liable for damage caused by the
violation. Vie are aware, however, of the growing dissatisfaction with the law of negligence as an effective and appropriate
means for governing compensation for the increasingly serious
harms caused by automobiles. (See Ehrenzweig, Negligence
Without Fault (1951); Keeton and O'Connell, Basic Protection for the Traffic Victim (1965); Franklin, Replacing Ute
Negligence Lottery (1967) 53 Va.L.R~v. 774; Keeton, Is
There a Place for Negligence in Modern Tort Law? (1967) 53
Va.L.Rev. 886; cf. Urie v. Thompson (1949) 337 U.S. 163, 196
[93 L.Ed. 1282, 1306, 69 S.Ct. 1018, 11 A.L.R.2d 252] (concurring opinion of Frankfurter, J.).) If the problem of fixing
responsibility under a system of strict liability were liS
uncomplicated as it seems to be in this case, a court might be
., tempted to follow the lead of decisions recognizing strict lia. bility in other circumstances. (See dissenting opinion of
Shenk, J., in Alarid v. Vanier, supra, 50 Ca1.2d 617,629.)
In few cases, however, are the fact.o; likely to be as simple as
they ·are here. In the next case an accident might be caused by
the combination of a brake failure and a stoplight failure
under circumstances that would have permitted effective use
of an emergency handbrake had the following motorist been
properly alerted by the stoplight required by the Vehicle
Code. (Veh. Code, § 24603.) In another case, a pedestrian
might stumble and fall on a dangerous and defective pavement causing a motorist having the right of way to drive
across the center line of the highway and strike a speeding
oncoming car. Who is to be strictly liable to whom in such
casesY However imperfectly it operates, thelaw of negligence
allocates the risks and determines who shall or shall not be
compensated when persons simultaneously engaged in the
common enterprise of 1l.sing the streets and highways have
accidents. It does so by'invoking familiar rules with respect
to the reasonably prudent man, duty, proximate cause, contributory negligence, last clear chance, the effect of statutory
l violations, and imminent peril. A rule of strict liability would
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require its own attendant coterie of rules to allocate risk and
govern compensation among co-users of the streets and highways.
Unless the ratio decidendi of a decision making an abrupt
change in the law can point with reasonable certainty to the
solution of similar cases, it cannot help but create uncertainty
in the area of its concern. In many situations the problems
caused by such uncertainty will not outweigh the considerations that dictate change as the appropriate common law
development. To invoke a rule of strict liability on users of
the streets and highways, however, without also establishing
in substantial detail how the new rule should operate would
only contribute confusion to the automobile accident problem.
Settlement and claims adjustment procedures would become
chaotic until the new rules were worked out on a case-by-case
basis, and' the hardships of delayed compensation would be'
seriously intensified. Only the Legislature, if it deems it wise
to do so, can avoid such difficulties by enacting a comprehensive plan for the compensation of automobile accident victims in place of or in addition to the law of negligence.
[lb] It does not follow, howcver, that the duty to exercise
reasonable care to maintain brakes so that they comply with
the provisions of the Vehicle Code can be delegated. This issue
was not raised or considered in the A.larid case. Although
there is language in Ponce v. Black (1964) 224 Cal.App.2d
159, 163 [36 Cal.Rptr. 419], suggesting that the duty is at
least in part nondelegable, we doubt that the court in that
case was addressing itself to that issue. We believe, however,
that the law governing nondelegable duties dictates imposing
such a duty here,
[4] Unlike strict liability, a nondelegable duty operates,
not as a substitute for liability based on negligence, but to
assure that when a negligently caused harm occurs, the injured party will be compensated by the person whose activity
caused the harm and who may therefore properly be held
liable for the negligence of his agent, whether his agent was
an employee or an independent contractor. To the extent that
recognition of nondelegable duties tends to insure that there
will be a financially responsible defendant available to compensate for the negligent harms caused by that defendant's
activity, it ameliorates the need for strict liability to secure
eompensat.ion.
We recently reviewed the law of nondelegable duties in
Van Arsdale v. Hollinger (1968) 68 Ca1.2d 245, 250-255
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[66 Cal.Rptr. 20, 437 P.2d 508], and there is no need to reiterate that discussion here. It is enough to point out that we
have found nondelegable duties in a wide variety of situations
and have recognized that the rules set forth in the Restatement of Torts with respect to such duties are generally in
accord with California law. Such duties include those imposed
by a public authority as a condition of granting a franchise
(Eli v. Murphy (1952) 39 Cal.2d 598, 599 [248 P.2d 756] ;
Taylor v. Oakland Scavenger Co. (1941) 17 Cal.2d 594, 604
[110 P.2d 1044] ; Kirk v. Santa Barbara Ice Co. (1910) 157
Cal. 591, 593 [108 P. 509] ; Colgrove v. Smith (1894) 102 Cal.
220,223-224 [36 P. 411, 27 L.R.A. 590]; Rest.2d Torts (1965)
§ 428) ; the duty of a condemning agent to protect a severed
parcel from damage (Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist.
v. Southern Cal. Bldg. & Loan Assn. (1961) 188 CaI.App.2d
850, 854 [10 Cal.Rptr. 811]) ; the duty of a general contractor
to construct a building safely (Dow v. Holly Mfg. Co. (1958)
49 Cal.2d 720, 726-727 [321 P.2d 736]) ; the duty to exercise
due care when an ". . . independent contractor is employed
to do work which the employer should recognize as nccessarily
creating a condition involving an unreasonable risk of bodily
harm to others unless special precautions are taken" (CourteU v. McEachen (1959) 51 Cal.2d 448, 457 [334 P.2d 870] ;
Van Arsdale v. Hollinger, supra, 68 Cal.2d 245, 254; Ambriz v. Petro lane Ltd. (1957) 49 Cal.2d 470, 481 [319 P.2d 1] ;
Rest.2d Torts (1965) § 416); the duty of landowners to maintain their property in a reasonably safe condition (Knell v.
Morris (1952) 39 Cal.2d 450, 456 [247 P.2d 352] ; Brown v.
George Pepperdine Foundation (1943) 23 Cal.2d 256 [143
P.2d 929] ; Rest.2d Torts (1965) § 422) and to comply with
applicable safety ordinances (Finnegan v. Royal Realty Co.
(1950) 35 Cal.2d 409, 423 [218 P.2d 17] ; Longway v. McCall
(1960) 181 Cal. App.2d 723, 731 [5 Cal.Rptr. 818]) ; and the
duty of employers and suppliers to comply with the safety
provisions of the Labor Code (Alber v. Owens (1967) 66 Cal.
2d 790, 792 [59 Cal.Rptr. 117, 427 P.2d 781]; DiMuro v.
Masterson Trusafe Steel Scaffold Co. (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d
784,792 [14 Cal.Rptr. 551]).
[5] Section 423 of the Restatement Second of Torts provides that" One who carries on an activity which threatens a
grave risk of serious bodily harm or death unless the instrumentalities used are carefully . . . maintained, and who employs an independent contractor to . . . maintain such
instrumentalities, is subject to the same liability for physical
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harm caused by the negligence of the contractor in . . •
I
maintaining such instrumentuliti(>s as though the employer
\'
Jlad himself dOllc the worlt of . . . maintenance." [6] Sec~
tion 424 provides that" Olle who by statute or by administrative regulation is under a duty to provide specified safeguards or precautions for the safety of others is subject to
Jiability to the others for whose protection the duty is
imposed for harm caused by the failure of a contractor
employed by him to provide such safeguards or precautions. "
[lc] Both of these sections point to a nondelegable duty
in this case. The statutory provisions regulating the maintenance and equipment of automobiles constitute express legislative recognition of the fact that improperly maintained
motor vehicles threaten "a grave risk of serious bodily harm
or death." The responsibility for minimizing that risk or
compensating for the failure to do so properly rests with the
person who owns and operates the vehicle. He is the party
primarily to be benefited by its use; he selects the contractor
and is free to insist upon one who is financially responsible__ _
and to demand indemnity from him; the cost of his liability
insurance that distributes the risk is properly attributable to
bis activities; and the discharge of the duty to exercise reasonable care in the maintenance of his vehicle is of the utmost
importance to the public. (See Van A.rsdaZe v. Hollinger,
supra, 68 Ca1.2d 245, 253, and authorities cited.)
rib] In the present case it is undisputed that the accident
was caused by a failure of defendant's brakes that resulted
from her independent contractor's negligence in overhauling
or in thereafter inspecting the brakes. Since her duty to maintain her brakes in compliance with the provisions of the
Vehicle Code is nondelegable, the fact that the brake failure
was the result of her independent contractor's negligence is
no defense.
The judgment and the order denying the motion for judgment notwitllstanding the verdict on the issue of liability are
reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court for a new
trial on the issue of damages only.
Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J., and Sullivan,
J., concurred.
McCOMB, J.-I dissent. I would affirm the judgment :lor
the reasons expressed by Mr. Presiding Justice Molinari in
the opinion prepared by him for the Court of Appeal in
Maloney v. Rath (CaI.App.) 65 Cal.Rptr. 386.

